This paper examines the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill after the successful acquisition of a publicly listed firm. Using hand collected data on the amount recorded as goodwill after a takeover, we document that 42% of acquirers record a nil amount for goodwill. We find that the amount allocated to goodwill is generally unrelated to target firm economic characteristics. In contrast, consistent with managerial opportunism we find a positive association between the use of accounting based bonus plans to compensate acquiring firm CEOs and the amount allocated to goodwill. The amount allocated to goodwill also increases after Australia adopted IFRS which no longer requires goodwill to be systematically amortised. Other variables associated with goodwill recognition include, the acquiring firm's leverage before the takeover announcement, the takeover premium, whether the target and the bidder operate in the same industry, existing goodwill in the target firm before the takeover announcement and the method of payment used in the acquisition. We also examine the proportion of the purchase price allocated to identifiable intangible assets.
Introduction
Following a business combination, accounting standards require consolidation of the acquired entity into the acquiring firm's financial statements. As part of the first time consolidation the parent entity is required to allocate the purchase price to the tangible and identifiable intangible assets and liabilities acquired (AASB 3: 'Business Combinations'). As this allocation is based on the fair value of the respective assets and liabilities the acquiring firm has significant discretion as to how to allocate the purchase price. Any residual between the purchase price and the fair value of the identifiable net assets of the acquired firm is then recorded as goodwill. The objective of this study is to examine the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Specifically, we investigate whether the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill after an acquisition is explained by opportunism, takeover characteristics and the underlying financial characteristics of the target and bidding firms.
The motivation for this study is twofold. Firstly, empirical evidence on the allocation of the purchase price after successful corporate acquisitions is limited. Given that there is discretion in undertaking this allocation, further evidence is needed on whether allocations reflect underling target and bidding firm economic characteristics or are driven by managerial opportunism (Holthausen and Watts 2001) . Consistent with managerial opportunism, Shalev et al. (2013) finds an over-allocation of the purchase price to goodwill when U.S. CEOs receive bonuses tied to accounting earnings as this, results in increases in post-acquisition earnings. Their study however, is conducted in a setting where goodwill is required to be impaired and not required to be amortised post-acquisition. We aim to add to the findings of Shalev et al. (2013) by investigating a setting where goodwill accounting changed from systematic amortisation to annual impairment. The Australian setting allows us to understand how a change in accounting standards impacts on management's incentives when Australian firms transition from local GAAP (systematic amortisation setting) to IFRS (annual impairment setting).
Second, we also add to prior research by investigating whether takeover deal characteristics impact on goodwill recognition. While goodwill recognition is the outcome of a successful acquisition, prior studies have generally ignored the fact that takeover characteristics such as, friendly/hostile acquisitions, synergic acquisitions and the bidding firm toehold may also explain the amount of recognised goodwill. We argue that when the bidding firm has more information about the target prior to the acquisition, less goodwill is recognised. In this instance the bidding firm is able to value the target with more certainty and as a result is unlikely to overpay. Furthermore, as goodwill is a measure of acquisition synergies, it is expected that more goodwill is recorded when synergistic acquisitions occur.Using a sample of 308 successful Australian takeovers from 1998 to 2012 we document that in 42% of takeovers the acquiring firm records neither goodwill nor a bargain purchase. This high proportion of takeovers with no recorded goodwill is unexpected as it indicates that the cost of acquisition in these takeovers is exactly equal to the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired. This finding suggest that bidding firms managers may be using their discretion to avoid the costly process of undertaking an accurate purchase price allocation, which includes complex valuation exercises. Descriptive evidence suggests these firms have lower leverage and CEO bonuses and are less likely to use cash as a payment method as opposed to firms which record goodwill. Firms which record no goodwill also allocate less of the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets. Acquisitions where no goodwill is recognised also tend to occur when the target and the bidder operate in the same industry.
We then conduct an analysis of the factors which are associated with the proportion of the purchase price recorded as goodwill. First, we examine whether goodwill recognition is associated with proxies for managerial opportunism. Consistent with an opportunism explanation we find that CEOs with an accounting based bonus plan allocate a greater proportion of the purchase price to goodwill. This finding suggests that the results of Shalev et al. (2013) hold in both a goodwill impairment setting and in a goodwill amortisation setting. We also find that the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill increases after Australia adopted IFRS and goodwill was no longer amortised. This result suggests that firms took advantage of the change in accounting requirements by allocating more to goodwill (and less to other depreciable assets) so as to achieve an improvement in profitability. Inconsistent with prior findings (e.g., Leftwich 1983 and Mather and Peirson 2006) , we document that the amount allocated to goodwill increases with bidding firm leverage. As goodwill is typically excluded from debt covenants an opportunistic manager would allocate less to goodwill as debt increases. However, additional analyses suggest that this positive association between leverage and acquired goodwill only holds when the bidding firms offer bonuses to their CEOs.
In terms of the takeover characteristics, we find a positive association between takeover premiums and acquired goodwill. This is consistent with expectations as goodwill is measured by accounting standards as the difference between the purchase price and the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired. Since a higher premium increases the purchase price, this is likely to flow into the amount recorded as goodwill. In addition, we find a negative association between synergistic acquisitions (i.e., target and bidders which operate in the same industry) and goodwill recognition. This result is surprising as goodwill is typically interpreted as representing synergies arising from the acquisition.
We also examine whether the target and bidding firms' underlying economic characteristics are associated with goodwill recognition. We find a positive association between recorded goodwill in acquisitions where the target firms have existing goodwill suggesting that they remain part of the unidentifiable intangible assets acquired by the bidding firms. Our analysis suggests that other economic characteristics of the firms, such as, target identifiable intangible assets, target property, plant and equipment, the target and bidder market to book ratio are not associated with the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Our results also indicate that the amount recorded as goodwill is positively associated with the use of cash payment. This result is consistent with prior studies that show that bidding firms tend to pay more when the payment method is purely cash (e.g.,
Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa 2010).
Overall our results tend to suggest that the underlying economic characteristics of the target and bidding do not explain the amount allocated to goodwill. In contrast, the findings tend to support the opportunistic view that managers manipulate the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill.
We contribute to the academic literature in a number of ways. First, we contribute to the accounting choice literature (Fields et al., 2001 and Armstrong et al., 2010) by examining managers' use of discretion in the decision on how to allocate the purchase price in acquisitions. Our findings suggest that when given accounting flexibility, some managers use their discretion to adjust the amount of the purchase price in a business combination that is allocated to goodwill. Second, our results indicate that the purchase price allocation is conditional on a number of target firm specific factors and takeover characteristics. This finding is of importance to research which examines the value relevance of goodwill and goodwill impairment (Barth and Clinch 1996; Jennings et al. 1996; Godfrey and Koh 2001; Dahmash et al. 2009 ) as our results indicate that goodwill is endogenously determined. As such, the factors that are associated with the purchase price allocation are also likely to be associated with the value relevance of goodwill.
Second, we extend previous research which examines the consequences of the adoption of IFRS (Barth et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; Chalmers et al., 2011a; Chalmers et al., 2012 , Cotter et al., 2012 Horton et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2013) . Our investigation of purchase price allocations pre-and post-Australia's adoption of IFRS provides evidence on whether the accounting requirements for goodwill influences the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Assuming that the purchase price allocation reflects the underlying characteristics of the takeover and the target and acquiring firms, changes in accounting rules are not expected to influence the amount allocated to goodwill. In contrast, if the purchase price allocation reflects opportunism we predict that prior to 2005 acquiring firms allocated a lower percentage of the purchase price to goodwill. This expectation arises because during that time period there was discretion available in regards to the amortisation of intangible assets and no discretion regarding the amortisation of goodwill. Furthermore, we also expect that after goodwill amortisation was removed (i.e. post-2005) that the under allocation of the purchase price to goodwill is reduced.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the background to accounting for business combinations in Australia and related research.
Section 3 develops the theory and describes the research method. Section 4 provides a discussion of the data collection process. Results of our analysis are presented in section 5, whilst section 6 concludes the paper.
Background

Accounting for goodwill in Australia
The accounting requirements for corporate acquisitions in Australia are currently prescribed in AASB 3. This accounting standard requires goodwill to be measured as the difference between the purchase consideration and the fair value of the identifiable net assets acquired (paragraph 32). Where the purchase consideration is not cash the purchase consideration must be measured using the fair value of the assets or equity provided as consideration (paragraph 37). Prior to Australia's adoption of IFRS in 2005 the amount recorded as goodwill was systematically amortised to earnings over a maximum period of 20 years (AASB 1013). After the adoption of IFRS, however, AASB 136 requires that goodwill is no longer amortised but is subject to annual impairment testing. Johnson and Petrone (1998) separate the amount recorded as purchased goodwill into the following components:
i)
The difference between the fair value and book value of the target firm's recognised net assets;
ii) The fair value of net assets not recognised by the target firm such as internally generated intangible assets;
iii) The fair value of the going concern component of the target firm as a standalone business (i.e., internally generated goodwill);
iv) The fair value of any synergies arising from the business combination between the target and bidding firms (i.e. purchased goodwill); v) Over or undervaluation of the consideration paid by the bidder.
vi) Over or under payment by the bidder
Under the requirements of the accounting standards only components iii) and iv)
should be recorded as goodwill. Components i) and ii) are required under accounting standards to be recorded separately as part of the business combination. However, in practice due to measurement difficulties or a lack of expertise by the acquiring firm and their auditors it is possible that these components are included as part of goodwill. Similarly, components v) and vi) do not represent goodwill but are likely to be included in the amount designated as goodwill due to this amount being recorded as the residual balance. As the manner of calculating goodwill relies on estimating the fair values of non-traded assets managers are afforded significant discretion in determining the amount allocated to any class of assets and ultimately goodwill.
Related research on goodwill
The accounting for purchased goodwill has been the subject of controversy for many years. The first point of contention regarding purchased goodwill is whether acquired goodwill is an asset (Johnson and Petrone 1998) . The recognition of goodwill as an asset is problematic as it is arguable as to whether goodwill provides future economic benefits. As a reflection of the uncertainty as to whether goodwill is an asset, the preferred treatment of the earlier UK accounting standard was that goodwill acquired in an acquisition be immediately written-off to reserves (Standard Accounting Practice 22: 'Accounting for Goodwill'). To test whether goodwill warrants reporting on the balance sheet as an asset prior studies have examined the value relevance of goodwill (Chauvin and Hirschey 1994; Barth and Clinch 1996; Jennings et al., 1996; Godfrey and Koh 2001; Bugeja and Gallery, 2006; Dahmash et al., 2009 In terms of the causes of goodwill write-offs, prior studies document that acquisition characteristics and performance indicators are associated with goodwill write-offs.
Subsequent goodwill impairment has been found to be positively associated with the payment of higher takeover premiums and the amount initially recorded as goodwill (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Gu and Lev 2011 and Li et al., 2011) . Empirical findings also suggest that the mode of consideration used in the acquisition is also associated with goodwill impairment.
Specifically, the component of consideration paid using overvalued stock is positively associated with goodwill impairment (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Gu and Lev 2011 and Li et al., 2011) . Goodwill impairment frequency has been found to be lower in focus enhancing acquisitions (Li et al., 2011) and in takeovers made by firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms (Gu and Lev 2011) . Furthermore, Godfrey and Koh (2009) Evidence on the market reaction to goodwill write-offs provides mixed findings.
While Francis, et al. (1996) find little share price reaction to goodwill write-offs, others have documented evidence of negative abnormal returns (e.g. Hirschey and Richardson 2002; Hayn and Hughes 2006; Bens et al. 2011; Li et al. 2011) . Furthermore, Abu Ghazaleh et al.
(2012) document a significantly negative association between goodwill write-offs and the market value of equity.
Prior research has also documented that when given a choice managers often prefer to minimise the amount recorded as goodwill. For example, prior to the introduction of an enforceable accounting standard the most common methods used to account for goodwill in Australia avoided systematic amortisation (Gibson and Francis 1975; Anderson and Zimmer 1992) . U.S. research has studied reasons for firms' preference for the pooling rather than the purchase method of accounting for acquisitions and concludes that this choice is driven by a desire to maximise reported earnings (Gagnon 1967; Copeland and Wodjak 1969; Aboody et al., 2000 and Ayers et al., 2002) .
More recently Shalev et al. (2013) study the amount allocated to goodwill for a sample of U.S. acquisitions. Consistent with opportunism they find evidence showing an over-allocation to goodwill by firms whose CEOs receive a greater proportion of their remuneration from accounting based bonus-plans. As goodwill is not amortised, allocating a higher amount of the purchase price to goodwill likely increases post-acquisition earnings and bonuses. However, their study takes place solely during a period of time when accounting standards required goodwill to be impaired, they do not provide evidence on whether the move from goodwill amortisation to impairment changed the proportion of the acquisition price allocated to goodwill. This study provides such evidence.
Theory development and research method
3.1 Determinants of the purchase price allocated to goodwill
Opportunism
Under the opportunistic view, managers use their discretion to either over or under allocate the purchase price to goodwill. The likelihood of opportunistic behaviour arises because the measurement of goodwill requires numerous estimates of fair values when assigning the purchase price to identifiable net assets (Holthausen and Watts 2001; Ramanna 2008 ). In particular, the majority of assets acquired are likely to not be traded on active markets increasing the need for subjective fair value estimates. We argue that managers may use this discretion to opportunistically determine the amount recorded as goodwill for a number of reasons. For instance, firms may have incentives to minimise the costs of completing an accurate purchase price allocation. As mentioned in section 2.1, the accounting standard requires acquiring firms to calculate the fair values of both recorded and unrecorded target firm identifiable net assets when calculating goodwill. This exercise is complex and requires an acquiring firm and their auditors to undertake difficult and costly valuation exercises. For some firms it may be simpler and less costly to simply pro rata the value of the purchase consideration across the non-monetary assets of the target firm so that the amount allocated to such assets equates to the purchase consideration resulting in no goodwill being
recorded. An additional incentive for recording a nil balance of goodwill is that it also avoids the complex annual task for preparers and auditors of testing the goodwill balance for impairment. 1 Finally, recognising a nil amount of goodwill means that firms do not have to recognise decreases in post-acquisition earnings either through systematic amortisation or annual impairment.
In line with managerial opportunism, we expect the decision to recognise goodwill to be associated with the financial reporting environment. Prior to Australia's adoption of IFRS, goodwill was amortised for a period not exceeding 20 years which decreases post-acquisition profits. This gives managers an incentive to report higher earnings by allocating more of the purchase price to longer lived assets or to assets with an indefinite life and less to goodwill, to avoid recording the systematic goodwill amortisation expense. This expectation is supported by prior research which suggests that managers prefer to avoid the amortisation of goodwill due to its income decreasing effect. For example, Gore et al. (2000) report that U.K. CEOs with profit based compensation plans prefer to immediately write-off goodwill to reserves as opposed to recording goodwill as an asset. Furthermore, U.S. research indicates that firms are willing to pay an additional premium to avoid the need to amortise goodwill through the use of the pooling method of accounting Shane 1990 and Ayers et al., 2002) . This line of research suggests that firms are reluctant to record goodwill when it needs to be amortised. 2 Thus, it is expected that before the adoption of IFRS in Australia, managers used their discretion to recognise less goodwill.
Post-Australia's adoption of IFRS, however, goodwill was no longer subject to amortisation but was subject to annual impairment testing. If managers act opportunistically they have an incentive to over-allocate an amount to goodwill as opposed to other depreciable assets to avoid a systematic annual charge against earnings (Shalev et al., 2013) . A counter argument is that over-allocating an amount to goodwill increases the probability that the firm needs to impair goodwill which potentially increases earnings volatility post-acquisition.
There are also costs associated with the subsequent impairment of goodwill such as negative 1 Prior to Australia's adoption of IFRS in 2005 goodwill was also tested annually for impairment (AASB 1013 paragraph 5.4). In 2009, The IASB issued IFRS for Small and Medium Sized Entities (SME's) which highlights that accounting standard setters recognise the complexity of goodwill impairment testing. That standard requires SME's to amortise goodwill over its estimated useful life, with the life set at 10 years if it cannot be reliably estimated (paragraphs 18.19, 18.20 and 19.23) . 22 Accounting standards in Australia have never allowed the use of the pooling method of accounting.
stock returns (e.g. Bens et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011 ) and a decrease in firm value (e.g. Abu Ghazaleh et al., 2012) . Although these capital market effects may motivate managers to not over-allocate an amount to goodwill we argue that there is an important difference between goodwill impairment and amortisation. In particular, managers have greater discretion as to when an impairment charge is recorded compared to certain annual amortisation.
Additionally, it is unlikely that at the time of making a takeover that bidding firm management expects that they will subsequently need to impair goodwill, particularly if they are 'infected' with hubris (Roll 1986 ).
There are also likely to be contractual incentives for managing the amount recorded as goodwill. First, goodwill and other intangible assets are typically not included in the calculation of leverage in debt contract covenants (Cotter, 1998) , prompting managers to allocate more of the purchase price to tangible assets rather than goodwill (e.g. Grinyer et al., 1991; Wong and Wong 2001; Beatty and Weber 2006) . 3 Second, when CEOs receive a higher level of compensation which is tied to accounting earnings they have an incentive to manipulate the amount recorded as goodwill to maximise their remuneration (Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Shalev et al., 2013) . Thus, we expect that prior to the adoption of IFRS, when a firm compensates their CEO using an accounting based bonus plan that the firm minimises the amount allocated to goodwill to avoid goodwill amortisation and hence maximise earnings. Furthermore, when goodwill amortisation was replaced by impairment post-IFRS we expect this association to reverse.
Therefore under the opportunistic view, managers use their discretion to manage the amount allocated to goodwill. This leads to the first hypothesis.
H 1a : The amount allocated to acquired goodwill increases after the adoption of IFRS and decreases with bidding firm leverage.
3 Beatty and Weber (2006) document that more than 50 per cent of bank debt contracts had covenants that exclude goodwill (amongst other intangible assets). In terms of the association between goodwill and leverage, Grinyer et al. (1991) find that the amount of goodwill is negatively related to acquiring firm leverage. Wong and Wong (2001) , however, argue that this finding is also consistent with an investment opportunity set explanation. They find that the amount allocated to goodwill for a sample of New Zealand takeovers is higher for firms with lower leverage and interpret their result to indicate that firms with lower leverage have a better investment opportunity set and as a result allocate a greater amount to goodwill. The influence of leverage on goodwill recognition is also examined by Gore et al. (2000) . They study management's preference for capitalising goodwill or immediately writing goodwill off against reserves using a survey conducted in the UK. They find that manager's prefer goodwill capitalisation when their firm has high gearing and a gearing based debt covenant restriction in place as the immediate write-off option would have the effect of increasing gearing by reducing firm equity.
H 1b : The amount allocated to acquired goodwill is associated with the use of CEO
bonus plans based on accounting profit.
Monitoring of opportunistic behaviour
In order to curb managerial discretion and to protect the interest of shareholders, firms are likely to put monitoring systems in place. We take the view that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audits and object to managerial discretion to misreport the accounts (e.g.
Francis and Yu 2009
). Also Big 4 auditors possess more expertise and resources than nonBig 4 firms and are better able to accurately identify unrecognised intangibles and to also value both recognised and unrecognised target firm assets. In contrast, non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to accept a simplistic approach of proportionately allocating the purchase price across existing target firm net assets resulting in no goodwill being recorded. Big 4 auditors are also more likely to have the skills to conduct complex goodwill impairment testing.
Therefore, we expect that bidders audited by a Big 4 audit firms to report more goodwill as Big 4 audit firms have both the ability to measure goodwill accurately and the incentives to curb managers' discretion to prepare their purchase price allocation opportunistically.
Furthermore, it is possible that the relative size of the target firm to the bidding firm impacts on the acquirer's decision to recognise goodwill. Grinyer et al. (1991) argue that takeovers which are considered large compared to the bidding firm's size attract more attention (for example, from the media). In this instance, we expect managers to exercise less discretion and expect that they devote more resources to achieving greater accuracy in the allocation of the purchase price to the various assets, including goodwill. Auditors are also likely to pay greater attention to the purchase price allocation in larger takeovers due to materiality reasons. As a result we expect a positive association between the relative size of the takeover and acquired goodwill.
In summary, external monitoring from audit firms, debt holders and other stakeholders are expected to curb managers' discretion in misreporting acquired goodwill suggesting a positive association between acquired goodwill and monitoring practices. This leads to our second hypothesis.
H 2 : There is an association between acquired goodwill and the use of Big 4 auditors
and the relative size of the acquisition
Takeover deal characteristics
The successful acquisition of a target firm is the result of extensive negotiations between the bidding firm and the target firm. We argue that a number of takeover characteristics influence the amount allocated to goodwill as they impact on the purchase price. First, we argue that greater access to information about the target firm gives the bidder an increased ability to accurately identify and value the target firm assets both before and after making a bid. As a result, the consideration offered is expected to be closer to the fair value of the net identifiable assets leading to a lower risk of overpayment and hence a reduction in the amount recorded as goodwill (i.e., category vi. of Johnson and Petrone 1998).
A higher ownership interest by the bidder in the target firm prior to the takeover (i.e., toehold) is likely to give the bidder greater access to target firm financial information prior to the takeover. This better information set may arise for example through the preparation of equity accounting. In addition, a prior equity stake in the target may provide the bidding firm with the ability to appoint a director to the target firm board thus reducing information asymmetry. Hence, we predict a negative association between the pre-takeover ownership interest of the bidding firm and acquired goodwill.
Whether the takeover is friendly or hostile is also expected to be associated with acquired goodwill. In friendly takeovers, the target firm typically grants permission for the bidder to conduct due diligence. This due diligence process provides the bidder with more detailed information on the value and existence of target firm assets and as a result the bidder may be less likely to over pay for the target firm. As a result, we predict a negative association between friendly takeovers and acquired goodwill.
A higher takeover premium may result in a greater amount of the purchase price being recorded in goodwill. The additional premium is expected to flow through to the amount recorded as goodwill, given that goodwill is calculated as the difference between the acquisition price and the target firm net identifiable assets. Takeover premiums may also reflect the acquisition synergies that the bidding firm expect from an acquisition (Sudarsanam and Sorwar (2010) . 4 Arguably operating synergies are also expected to be greatest when the bidding firm and the target firm are in the same industry. Given that goodwill is argued to be a measure of acquisition synergies, we expect the takeover premium and acquisitions in the same industry to be positively associated with goodwill recognition.
The above arguments lead to the third hypothesis. 
Economic characteristics of the target and bidding firm
The purchase price allocation to goodwill is fundamentally determined by the underlying economic characteristics of the target and the bidding firms. We argue that more goodwill is recognised in acquisitions of target firms which have greater amounts of existing goodwill prior to the acquisition. The existing goodwill of the target firm is expected to remain part of the unidentifiable intangible assets identified by the bidding firm (Shalev et al., 2013) . Furthermore, the method of accounting for a business combination requires the recording of all tangible and identifiable intangible assets at fair value before calculating the amount of goodwill. Therefore, it is expected that a higher amount of acquired target firm tangible and intangible assets pre-acquisition reduces the amount allocated to goodwill.
In terms of the economic characteristics of the bidding firm, overvalued bidders (as captured by market to book ratio) are more likely to overpay in an acquisition (Li et al. 2011 ).
This overpayment is expected to overstate the amount allocated to goodwill since goodwill is the residual between the purchase price and the identifiable net assets acquired. Finally, we argue that the payment method used (equity versus cash) may also explain the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. Results from prior research suggest that the bidding firm is likely to pay higher premiums when the payment method is cash (e.g., Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa 2010). Moreover, equity payments by the bidding firm may indicate that the equity of the bidding firm is overvalued (Myers and Majluf 1984) . This overvaluation is likely to increase the amount recorded as goodwill. Given the two competing views, we argue that there is an association between the payment method and the amount of the purchase price recorded as goodwill but do not make a prediction as to the sign of the direction. 
The dependent variable GW_DV is the dollar value of the purchase price allocated to goodwill scaled by the value of the deal. Our first set of variables capture managerial opportunism. To identify takeovers in which the first year of consolidation occurs after Australia adopted IFRS we include in the model an indicator variable (IFRS). We also control for contractual incentives to manage the amount allocated to goodwill. Bidder firm leverage (B_LEV) measured using the ratio of debt to equity for the financial year prior to the acquisition is used to control for the incentive of firms to allocate the purchase price to tangible assets which are included in debt covenant ratios. The influence of CEO bonus plans is controlled in the model using an indicator variable coded as one if the firm compensates their managers using a bonus plan based on accounting earnings (BONUS). This variable is also interacted with the IFRS indicator variable to determine whether the association between CEO compensation structure and the amount allocated to goodwill changed after the adoption of IFRS (IFRSxBONUS).To capture the strength of the monitoring system in place to curb managerial opportunism we include in the model, an indicator variable highlighting acquisitions in which the acquiring firm uses a Big 4 auditor in the first financial year in which the target firm is consolidated, zero otherwise (BIG4). As indicated above we including bidding firm leverage in the model. This variable also controls for the monitoring role of debt holders. 6 We also include in the regression the relative size of the target to the bidder measured using the natural logarithm of the target firm to acquiring firm market capitalisation two months before the takeover announcement (RELSIZE).
To control for takeover characteristics we include four variables in model (1). First, we control for the equity ownership of the bidder in the target at the date of the takeover announcement (TOEHOLD). We also identify whether the takeover offer is friendly.
5 A tobit regression is used since the amount allocated to goodwill is censored at zero. 6 We use the acquiring firm leverage ratio the year before the acquisition to exclude the effects of the takeover on leverage after the acquisition. Results are unchanged if we use leverage in the first year the target firm is consolidated.
Friendly takeovers are denoted in the regression using a binary variable coded as one when the initial recommendation of the target firm board is takeover acceptance (FRIENDLY). To capture synergies arising from the acquisition we control for the takeover premium and industry of the target and bidding firms. The takeover premium (PREMIUM) is calculated as the offer price minus the target share price two months prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the price two months prior to the takeover announcement. We also control for SAMEIND which is an indicator variable set to equal to one if the target and bidder firm operate in the same industry as measured using two-digit GICS codes.
We also control for the economic characteristics of the target and the bidding firms. First, we include the amount of the existing goodwill on the target firm balance sheet (T_GW_DV). Goodwill already recorded by the target firm is expected to remain part of the unidentifiable assets of the combined group and as a result should be positively associated with the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. As the amount allocated to goodwill is determined after adjusting the fair values of other target firm assets we include controls for the target firm's net property plant and equipment (T_PPE_DV) and recognised identifiable intangible assets (T_IIA_DV). These three variables are extracted from the target firm financial statements for the financial year prior to the takeover and are scaled by deal value. If the difference between the purchase consideration and the book value of target firm assets is recorded firstly against already recognised assets then there is expected to be a negative association between T_PPE_DV and T_IIA_DV and recorded goodwill. To capture the growth potential of the target firm, we control for the target firm's market to book ratio calculated two months before the takeover announcement (T_MB). 7 Finally, we control for the bidding firm's market to book ratio (B_MB) and consideration form used by the bidding firm through the use of an indicator variable denoting takeovers in which the payment form is completely cash, zero otherwise (PAYCASH).
We control for industry fixed effects in the estimation of model (1) through the use of indicator variables based on the target firm two digit GICS code. In the interest of brevity we do not report the results on these variables. Standard errors are also clustered by the year of takeover announcement to correct for potential serial correlation. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the definitions of all variables used in this study.
Sample and data
The Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions database is used to identify all takeovers announced for Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed targets between 1998 and 2012.
This search identified 1,239 takeovers. Since this study is investigating the amount allocated to goodwill after successful acquisitions it is necessary to exclude 394 unsuccessful takeovers. As the amount of goodwill recorded after an acquisition is collected from the financial statements of the successful bidder we delete 346 takeovers in which the bidding firm is not listed on the ASX. For a similar reason it is also necessary to eliminate 20 takeovers in which the acquiring firm is delisted from the ASX prior to the dissemination of their financial statements post-acquisition. Due to missing data needed to estimate the variables we remove 171 observations from the estimation of model (1). The sample collection process is summarised in Table 1 .
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Panel A of Table 2 presents the temporal distribution of the sample. The two years with the highest proportion of takeovers are 2006 and 2007 with respectively 10.4% and 9.4% of successful takeovers occurring in these two years. The lowest number of takeovers occurs in the first year of the sample (i.e., 1998).
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The breakdown of the sample by target and acquiring firm industry is shown in Panel B of Table 2 . Industrial classification is based on target and acquiring firm two digit GICS codes. Approximately 30% of target and bidding firms are from the materials sector. The second largest sector included in our sample is financial firms (approximately 16%), followed by takeovers in the consumer discretionary industry (between 13-14%). The industry sector with the lowest representation in the sample is utilities. We control for industry fixed effects in the estimation of our regression models using indicator variables for target firm two digit GICS codes.
We collect the amount of the purchase price allocated to goodwill for each target firm by firstly downloading the acquiring firm's financial statements subsequent to the takeover using the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. We then read through the notes to the accounts to determine the first year in which the target firm is consolidated. For this financial year we hand collect the amount (if any) of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and identifiable intangible assets. 8 We also hand collect for that year details of the acquiring firm auditor and whether the financial statements are prepared using IFRS. The target firm takeover documents lodged with the ASX are used to manually collect information on the recommendation of the target firm board to shareholders. In a similar fashion, we collect from the bidding firm documents lodged with the ASX details of: the bidding firm toehold, the initial offer price and the method of payment. The Morningstar DatAnalysis database is used as the source of both the target and bidding firm takeover documents. Share price information used to calculate takeover premiums, relative size and market to book ratios are extracted from the Core Research Database maintained by SIRCA. Accounting information needed to calculate bidding firm leverage, and asset values (i.e, goodwill, identifiable intangible assets and property plant and equipment) and the book values of equity for the target and acquiring firm are obtained from the financial statements released for the year prior to the takeover announcement. We determine the existence of an accounting based bonus plan for the bidding firm CEO by reading through the directors' report included in the bidding firm's annual report in the year prior to the takeover announcement. Table 3 presents the mean for each of the variables after partitioning the sample by whether the takeover is first consolidated before or after the adoption of IFRS. A comparison of variables before and after the adoption of IFRS shows that the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill is higher after the adoption of IFRS, although the difference is insignificant. A number of the other variables show significant changes after the adoption of IFRS. The results show that the target and bidding firm market-to-book ratios (T_MB and B_MB) and the use of friendly acquisitions (FRIENDLY) are significantly higher in the post-IFRS sub-sample. In contrast, after the adoption of IFRS we find a significant decrease in the ownership stake of the bidder in the target firm (TOEHOLD).
Panel C of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in model (1) partitioned by whether the CEO of the acquiring firm has an accounting based compensation plan in place for the year prior to the takeover. There is no significant difference for the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and identifiable intangible assets for firms with and without a CEO accounting based bonus plan in place. We find that acquiring firms which use accounting based bonus plans are more likely to offer cash payment (PAYCASH) and engage Big 4 audit firms (BIG4). The greater use of Big 4 auditors by these firms is suggestive of larger firms remunerating their CEO with accounting based bonus schemes.
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 show the presence of significant outliers. As a result we winsorise the top and bottom 1% of the continuous variables when estimating model (1). Table 4 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the variables included in the regression model.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
We find a significant positive correlation between bidding firm leverage (B_LEV) and the percentage allocated to goodwill. Also, consistent with predictions there is a significant negative association between the acquiring firm toehold (TOEHOLD) and the amount allocated to goodwill. In line with expectations, there is a significant positive correlation between takeover premiums (PREMIUM) and the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. As predicted, the results show a significant positive correlation between the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill and the pre-takeover goodwill of the target firm (T_GW_DV). The positive correlation between pre-takeover target firm PPE (T_PPE_DV) and the proportion allocated to goodwill is however unexpected. The size of the correlations between the independent variables included in the model (1) indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a concern with the estimation of the regression model. This is confirmed by VIF diagnostics testing conducted after estimating the regression model.
Results
Purchase price allocated to goodwill
The results of estimating regression model (1) examining the factors which influence the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill are presented in Table 5 .
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
The first six independent variables are proxies for opportunism and monitoring. The dummy variable denoting takeovers consolidated using IFRS is positive and significant indicating that the change from goodwill amortisation to goodwill impairment increased the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. This finding indicates that firms have taken advantage of the new accounting regime to allocate more of the purchase price to a non-amortised asset which results in higher reported earnings. The results also show that acquiring firms with higher pre-acquisition leverage (B_LEV) are more likely to allocate a greater percentage of the purchase price to goodwill. 9 This finding is inconsistent with an opportunism explanation but could be suggestive of the increased monitoring of debt holders in financial reporting. Greater monitoring of borrowers may be more likely in Australia due 9 This result is inconsistent with prior studies as firms with higher leverage would be expected to allocate a greater proportion of the purchase price to tangible assets to allow the firm to loosen any debt covenants that are defined excluding intangible assets. Our results are also inconsistent with Wong and Wong (2001) who argue that firms with low leverage have a better investment opportunity set and as a result allocate a greater amount of the purchase price to goodwill.
to the prevalence of corporate lending from public banks as opposed to public debt issues (Cotter, 1998) .
The result on BONUS is positive and significant, but the interaction of this variable with IFRS is insignificant. As such, our results suggest that bidding firms which compensate their CEO with accounting based remuneration allocate a greater proportion of the purchase price to goodwill and this association was unchanged after Australia's adoption of IFRS. A possible explanation of this finding is that before IFRS adoption goodwill was amortised over a maximum period of 20 years. As this amortisation period likely exceeds the useful life employed for other tangible assets, allocating a greater amount of the purchase price to goodwill is likely to minimise depreciation and amortisation charges and maximise firm profit. Turning to the variables which proxy for firm monitoring we find no association between Big 4 audit firms (BIG4) and the relative size of the target to the bidder (RELSIZE) and the amount of the deal value allocated to goodwill.
10
H 3a predicts that due to lower information asymmetry the proportion of the purchase price recorded as goodwill is lower in friendly acquisitions and acquisitions in which the bidding firm has a higher toehold. The results, however, are inconsistent with expectations with an insignificant coefficient on both TOEHOLD and FRIENDLY. We find a significant positive association between takeover premiums (PREMIUM) and the percentage of the purchase price allocated to goodwill. This result is unsurprising because as discussed by Johnson and Petrone (1998) , goodwill is calculated as the residual between the purchase price and the fair value of the net assets acquired. Since a higher premium mechanically increases the size of the purchase price this is likely to result in a higher amount being recorded as the residual difference (i.e., goodwill). The coefficient on SAMEIND is significant but the negative sign is counter to our expectations. As synergies would be predicted to be higher in takeovers amongst firms in the same industry it was expected that these takeovers would result in a higher amount being allocated to goodwill.
In terms of the economic characteristics of the target firm, we only find the coefficient on T_GW_DV to be significant in the predicted direction with the results indicating a higher amount is allocated to goodwill when the target firm has greater pre-existing goodwill.
10 We also estimate the regression replacing the relative size variable with separate variables for the acquiring and target firm size measured using the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of each firm two months prior to the takeover announcement. Both the target and bidder size variables in this alternative regression are insignificant and the other results remain unchanged.
Surprisingly, target and the bidder firm market-to-book ratios are insignificant in the regression results. We find that goodwill is more likely to be recorded when the method of payment is cash (PAYCASH). As acquiring firms which offer equity have flexibility in regards to the value attributed to the purchase consideration our findings suggest that acquiring firms use this flexibility to record less goodwill. An alternative explanation is that the characteristics of target firms acquired with cash are associated with a higher level of purchased goodwill. Interestingly, our findings are inconsistent with prior studies which document greater goodwill and goodwill impairment when equity is used as payment consideration (Hayn and Hughes 2006; Gu and Lev 2011 and Li et al., 2011) .
Additional analysis
The results presented above show that acquiring firms which compensate their CEO using an accounting based bonus plan allocate a greater amount of the purchase price to goodwill. This conclusion is similar to that reported in Shalev et al. (2013) . A possible concern with this finding is that firms self-select whether to offer an accounting based compensation plan to their executives. As such, the result we document may be driven by omitted correlated variables that are associated with the decision to offer the CEO an accounting based bonus plan. To partially address this concern we partition our sample into those firms with and without a CEO accounting based bonus plan and estimate model (1) separately for each of these two groups. These results are presented in Table 6 .
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
A comparison of the findings shown in Table 6 indicates a contrasting effect of the adoption of IFRS on the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill for the two groups. For firms with an accounting based bonus plan the IFRS dummy is insignificant suggesting that the change in accounting requirements had no impact on the decision to recognise goodwill.
Combined with the results documented in Table 5 , this suggests such CEOs that have an accounting based bonus-plan allocated an additional amount to goodwill and this was unchanged by the adoption of IFRS. In contrast, for firms without an accounting based bonus plan the IFRS dummy is positive and significant. As such, these firms post-IFRS allocated an additional amount to goodwill potentially to report higher earnings due to goodwill no longer being amortised.
Interestingly, the unexpected finding on bidder leverage is only significant for firms which offer their CEO an accounting based bonus plan. There is also now some evidence consistent with H 3a as the bidding firm toehold variable is now negative for bidding firms whose CEOs receive an accounting based bonus. We also find a positive association between cash payment and acquired goodwill when the CEO receives a bonus. After partitioning the sample the results continue to suggest that the target firm economic characteristics generally do not influence the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill with the exception of T_GW_DV.
Allocation of the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets
The adoption of IFRS in Australia in 2005 also led to changes in the accounting for identifiable intangible assets. Before 2005 the accounting for identifiable intangible assets was largely unregulated and management had discretion to recognise both purchased and internally generated identifiable intangible assets. 11 Identifiable intangible assets acquired as part of a business combination were required to be recorded at their fair value (AASB 1015
Acquisition of Assets). Furthermore, in the absence of accounting guidance, management had discretion as to whether intangible assets that were recorded (including those acquired in a business combination) were amortised systemically to the income statement. consistent with IFRS adoption in Australia improving the value relevance of goodwill. In contrast, the value relevance of other intangibles is found to be higher using the pre-IFRS accounting standards. Chalmers et al. (2011b) examine if the association between goodwill charges to the income statement and a firm's investment opportunity set changed after Australia's adoption of IFRS. They show that goodwill charges have a higher association with a firm's investment opportunity set only in the goodwill impairment regime (i.e., post-IFRS). They interpret this finding as showing that goodwill charges better reflect the underlying economic reality of a firm when goodwill is impaired as opposed to amortised.
Meanwhile Chalmers et al. (2012) find that after the adoption of IFRS, the size and dispersion of analyst forecast error is more negatively associated with reported intangible assets than pre-IFRS, with this result being driven by goodwill.
The above discussion highlights that managers were provided broad discretion over whether to amortise identifiable intangible assets acquired in a business combination before the adoption of IFRS. If firms acted opportunistically they could maximise post-acquisition profits by over allocating the purchase price to such assets and not subsequently amortising them. Furthermore, this approach would minimise the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill which was subject to periodic amortisation. After the adoption of IFRS, the necessity to amortise intangible assets was dependent on whether managers determined that these assets had a finite or indefinite life. In consequence, the change in accounting requirements for intangible assets upon adopting IFRS does not have a conclusive impact on post-acquisition profit as firms can continue to avoid amortisation by classifying these assets as having an indefinite life.
To provide evidence on whether the change in the accounting requirements for intangible assets upon the adoption of IFRS influenced the allocation of the purchase price to identifiable intangible assets we re-estimate a modified version of model (1). This alternative model employs as the dependent variable the proportion of the purchase price allocated to identifiable intangible assets (IIA_DV). The independent variables are consistent with those in the original model. The results of estimating this regression are presented in Table 7 .
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
The results presented in Table 7 show that the IFRS dummy has an insignificant coefficient suggesting that the adoption of IFRS did not influence the percentage of the purchase price in acquisitions which is allocated to identifiable intangible assets. 13 The other variables capturing opportunism are also insignificant. For instance, inconsistent with opportunism being associated with the allocation to identifiable intangible assets both the CEO bonus indicator variable (BONUS) and bidder leverage (B_LEV) are statistically insignificant. The bidding firm toehold (TOEHOLD) is significantly negatively associated with the allocation of the purchase price to identifiable intangibles. One possible explanation is that a higher toehold lowers information asymmetry regarding the value of intangible assets resulting in a lower likelihood of overpayment. Of the target firm economic characteristics we find a positive association between existing identifiable intangible assets of the target (T_IIA_DV) and the amount recorded as identifiable intangible assets postacquisition. We also find a negative association between existing PPE of the target firm (T_PPE_DV) and the amount recognised as identifiable intangible assets. This association is to be expected, since the greater the proportion of the purchase price allocated to other assets, such as PPE, less of the deal value remains to be allocated to identifiable intangible assets.
Conclusion
The accounting for purchased goodwill is controversial and has been subject to a substantial amount of previous research. An area that has received little attention in prior studies are the factors which determine the amount recorded as goodwill at the time the target firm is first consolidated into the bidding firm's financial statements. This study addresses this void in the literature. Our results tend to support the argument that the allocation of the purchase price to goodwill is opportunistic and suggest that the amount allocated to goodwill does not appear to reflect synergy potential. A possible area for future research is to further refine these tests using better measures of target firm growth potential and acquisition synergies.
13 In additional testing the regression model was estimated separately for firms with and without an accounting based CEO bonus plan. The IFRS indicator variable was insignificant for the sub-group with an accounting based bonus plan and positive and significant for firms without an accounting based bonus plan. These results indicate that firms which do not provide an accounting based bonus plan to their CEO allocated more to identifiable intangible assets post-IFRS. One possible explanation for this finding is that, such an allocation allows firms to take advantage of the discretion associated with the determination of the lives of these assets to potentially increase profitability. This possibility is difficult to verify however, as firms do not disclose whether identifiable intangible assets acquired in an acquisition have finite or indefinite lives.
Consistent with firms undertaking their purchase price allocation opportunistically, we find that the amount allocated to goodwill increases after the adoption of IFRS when goodwill is no longer amortised. Thus, it appears that bidding firms took advantage of this change in accounting requirements to allocate more to goodwill to increase reported profitability post-acquisition. We also document a positive association between the amount allocated to goodwill and the use of accounting based CEO bonus plans by acquiring firms.
This association was unchanged by the adoption of IFRS. Therefore, it appears that CEOs that are remunerated partially based on accounting results have consistently allocated more to goodwill after an acquisition. A possible explanation of this finding is that pre-IFRS an overallocation of the purchase price to goodwill increases reported profit as the life of other tangible assets are likely to be shorter than the 20 year life used for amortising goodwill. We also show that firms offering cash as payment are more likely to record goodwill.
We also find evidence that more leveraged acquiring firms allocate a higher amount to goodwill. This result is inconsistent with opportunism. Our results, however, show no association between the use of Big 4 auditors and the amount allocated to goodwill.
Supporting the results in earlier studies we find that a higher takeover premium results in the recording of additional goodwill. This result is unsurprising as any additional premium is expected to flow through to the amount recorded as goodwill, given that goodwill is calculated as the difference between the purchase price and the target firm identifiable net assets.
Collectively, our findings highlight that managers use their discretion when conducting purchase price allocations following a business combination. Our results are likely to be of interest to accounting standard setters when debating how to account for goodwill post-acquisition, as our findings suggests firms have opportunistically increased their allocation of the purchase price to goodwill after IFRS adoption. Future research could shed further light on other contractual and non-contractual incentives to over or under allocate the purchase price in acquisitions to goodwill (e.g. earnings volatility or capital raising). 
